Extreme Voting under Proportional Representation: The Multidimensional Case

We study the strategic behavior of voters in a model of proportional representation, in which thepolicy space is multidimensional. Our main finding is that in large electorate, under some assumptionson voters'preferences, voters essentially vote, in any equilibrium, only for the extreme parties

On Asymmetric Behaviors if Voting is Costly

Most of the voting models restrict themselves to the analysis of symmetric equilibria, i.e. equilibria in which ‘similar’ voters make ‘similar’ voting decisions. In this paper we investigate this assumption under costly pluralityvoting. In any pure strategy equilibrium, if two active voters have the same preference order over candidates, they do vote for the same candidate. However, as an example shows, this type of result cannot be hoped for mixed strategies equilibria

On the generic strategic stability of nash equilibria if voting is costly

We prove that for generic plurality games with positive cost of voting, the number of Nash equilibria is finite. Furthermore all the equilibria are regular, hence stable sets as singletons

ON THE GENERIC STRATEGIC STABILITY OF NASH EQUILIBRIA IF VOTING IS COSTLY

We prove that for generic plurality games with positive cost of voting, the number of Nash equilibria is finite. Furthermore all the equilibria are regular, hence stable sets as singletons.

Extreme voting under proportional representation: the multidimensional case.

We study the strategic behavior of voters in a model of proportional representation, in which the policy space is multidimensional. Our main finding is that in large electorate, under some assumptions on voters' preferences, voters essentially vote, in any equilibrium, only for the extreme parties.

Meetings with costly participation: a comment

In a recent paper Osborne, Rosenthal and Turner (2000) investigate a model of meetings with costly participation. Their main result is that the equilibrium number of participants is small and their positions are extreme. In particular, when the policy space is one-dimensional and the policy outcome is the median of participants' positions, they conclude that the number of attendees is even. The proof is flawed. We construct an example with an odd number of attendees. Oddness of the number of participants has a dramatic consequence on how equilibria look like

ON ASYMMETRIC BEHAVIORS IF VOTING IS COSTLY

Most of the voting models restrict themselves to the analysis of symmetric equilibria, i.e. equilibria in which "similar" voters make "similar" voting decisions. In this paper we investigate this assumption under costly plurality voting. In any pure strategy equilibrium, if two active voters have the same preference order over candidates, they do vote for the same candidate. However, as an example shows, this type of result cannot be hoped for mixed strategies equilibria.

On the expect of ideology in proportional representation systems

In this paper we propose a model in which there are ideological and strategic voters who vote under poportional rule. We prove that the behavior of ideological voters matters, in that it a¤ects the outcome. We also show how a subset of strategic voters changes his voting be- havior to balance the ideological players? votes. However, they can only partially adjust. Strategic voters will vote accordingly to this cutpoint outcome: any strategic voter on its right votes for the right- most party and any strategic voter on its left votes for the leftmost party.Proportional Election, Strategic Voting, Ideological Voting.

On the generic strategic stability of nash equilibria if voting is costly.

We prove that for generic plurality games with positive cost of voting, the number of Nash equilibria is finite. Furthermore all the equilibria are regular, hence stable sets as singletons.

Some results on strategic voting and proportional representation with multidimensional policy space.

We study a model of proportional representation, in which the policy space is multidimensional. We first show, via an example, that the assumption of quasi-concavity of the utility function is not sufficient to obtain the result that only the extreme parties get votes, contrary to the unidimensional case. We, then, study two cases in which stronger assumptions on voters' preferences assure that voters essentially vote, in any equilibrium, only for the extreme parties.